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#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# Extract information on the fetchmail project size from the NEWS file
#
# Note: this only works if you have a news file from 5.1.1 or later --
# I didn't patch the code sizes into NEWS until then.
#
my($release, $date, $jdate);

%month_offsets = (
	"Jan",   0,
	"Feb",   31,
	"Mar",   59,
	"Apr",   90,
	"May",   120,
	"Jun",   151,
	"Jul",   181,
	"Aug",   212,
	"Sep",   243,
	"Oct",   273,
	"Nov",   304,
	"Dec",   334,
);


sub day_offset
{
    my($datestring) = @_;
    my($wday, $month, $day, $time, $zone, $year) = split(' ', $datestring);
    my($jdate);

    # We don't deal with leap years here because the baseline day is after
    # the last leap year (1996) and there's a long time before the next
    # one (2004).
    $jdate = ($year - 1996) * 365;

    $jdate += $month_offsets{$month};

    $jdate += ($day - 1);

    # Baseline day for the size data was Fri Oct 25 23:02:26 EDT 1996 
    $jdate -= 297;

    return($jdate);
}

open(NEWS, "NEWS");
$timestamp = `date`;
chop $timestamp;
$release = "unknown";
$lines = "unknown";
$date = "unknown";
$jdate = "unknown";
print <<EOF;
# Population data from fetchmail NEWS file, as of $timestamp.
#
# Output other than pass-through % lines is tab-separated fields.
# Field 1: release ID
# Field 2: count of source lines under version control 
# Field 3: count of fetchmail-friends subscribers
# Field 4: count of fetchmail-announce subscribers
# Field 5: total subscribers to both lists
# Field 6: date of release (days since first datum)
# Field 7: date of release (RFC822 date format)
#
EOF
while ($_ = <NEWS>)
{
    my($sum);

    if (/^%/) {
	print $_;
    }
    elsif (/^fetchmail-([^ ]*) \(([^)]+)\)(, [0-9]* lines)?:/) {
	$release = $1;
	$date = $2;
	$jdate = &day_offset($date);
	if ($3) {
	    $lines = substr($3, 2, length($3) - 8);
	} else {
	    $lines = 'na'
	}
    }
    elsif (/There are ([0-9]*) people on fetchmail-friends and ([0-9]*) on fetchmail-announce/) {
	$sum = $1 + $2;
	print "${release}\t${lines}\t$1\t$2\t${sum}\t${jdate}\t${date}\n";
	$release = "unknown";
	$date = "unknown";
    }
    elsif (/There are ([0-9]*) people on the fetchmail-friends list./) {
	print "$release\t${lines}\t$1\t0\t$1\t$jdate\t$date\n";
	$release = "unknown";
	$date = "unknown";
    }
}

# end
pan class="p">{ return result; } len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1, sizeof(challenge1.cstr)); if (len < 0) { report(stderr, GT_("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess * problem. */ { char tmp[4]; *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr); memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); } /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the * first component of the host name of the server with all letters * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided * 32-bit number in network byte order. */ strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1); srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0'; for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) { if (isupper(*p)) { *p = tolower(*p); } } strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1); srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0'; if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) { *p = '\0'; } result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session); memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials); des_key_sched(session, schedule); result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* * Andrew H. Chatham <andrew.chatham@duke.edu> alleges that this check * is not necessary and has consistently been messing him up. */ if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) { report(stderr, GT_("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser, user); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } #endif /* __UNUSED__ */ if (tktinst[0]) { report(stderr, GT_("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"), tktinst); strcat(tktuser, "."); strcat(tktuser, tktinst); } if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) { strcat(tktuser, "@"); strcat(tktuser, tktrealm); } result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, challenge1.cint); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) { report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); } strcat(buf1, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the * verification be successful, the server must add one to the * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive. * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The * client should consider the server authenticated if the first * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the * checksum it previously sent. */ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) return result; /* The client must construct data with the first four octets * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets * containing a user name string. The client must then append * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the * data with the session key and respond to the second ready * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to * be performed; the server must verify that the principal * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as * that user. After these verifications, the authentication * process is complete. */ len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1, sizeof(buf2)); if (len < 0) { report(stderr, GT_("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0); memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4); if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) { report(stderr, GT_("challenge mismatch\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat); result = htonl(challenge1.cint); memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result); /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as * follows: * * 1 No protection mechanism * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection */ authenticator.dat[4] = 1; len = strlen(tktuser); strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len); authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1; while (authenticator.length & 7) { authenticator.length++; } des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule, &session, 1); to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); /* ship down the response, accept the server's error/ok indication */ suppress_tags = TRUE; result = gen_transact(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); suppress_tags = FALSE; if (result) return(result); else return(PS_SUCCESS); } #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ /* kerberos.c ends here */