aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/contrib/fetchsetup
blob: 0adf4751234c7d226199c3bb3ca41d6725ed43f1 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
#!/bin/sh

MSG() {
cat << EOF

# Fetchsetup is a shell script for creating a .fetchmailrc file,  
# that will be used by the program "fetchmail" to connect to your 
# mail domain and retrieve your mail. 
# This script is linux specific, so it may not work on another system.
# Kent Robotti <krobot@erols.com> (3-31-99)

EOF
}

if [ ! "$UID" = "0" ]; then
echo "[$LOGNAME] You need to be [root] to run this script."
echo "You could login: root"
echo "You could also try one of these: # sudo fetchsetup"
echo "                                 # su -c fetchsetup"
exit 1
fi

MSG
echo -n "Continue? (Y/n) : "
read ans
if [ "$ans" = "n" -o "$ans" = "N" ]; then
echo "Cancelled."
exit 0
fi

stty erase "^?" 2>/dev/null

echo
echo "Remote mail site?: pop.boo.com   <Your service providers mail domain name>"
echo -n "Remote mail site?: "
read SITE
echo
echo "Protocol?: pop3   <My service provider uses the 'pop3' mail protocol>"
echo "Protocol?: auto   <If not sure put: auto>"
echo "Choices: apop auto etrn imap imap-gss imap-k4 kpop pop2 pop3 rpop sdps" 
echo -n "Protocol?: "
read PROTO
echo
echo "Remote username?: jerry   <My username or login is jerry>"
echo -n "Remote username?: "
read USR
echo
echo "Remote password?: ?       <What's the password for?: $USR>"
echo -n "Remote password?: "
read PASS

echo
echo -n "Create $HOME/.fetchmailrc file? (Y/n) : "
read ans
if [ "$ans" = "n" -o "$ans" = "N" ]; then
echo
echo "Fetchsetup cancelled."
echo
exit 0
fi

echo 'poll "'$SITE'"' > $HOME/.fetchmailrc
echo "protocol $PROTO" >> $HOME/.fetchmailrc
echo 'username "'$USR'"' >> $HOME/.fetchmailrc
echo 'password "'$PASS'"' >> $HOME/.fetchmailrc
 
PROCMAIL=`type -all procmail | sed -n "1 p" | cut -d' ' -f3`  
SENDMAIL=`type -all sendmail | sed -n "1 p" | cut -d' ' -f3`  

if [ ! "$PROCMAIL" = "" ]; then
echo 'mda "'$PROCMAIL -d %s'"' >> $HOME/.fetchmailrc
MDA="1"
elif [ ! "$SENDMAIL" = "" ]; then
echo 'mda "'$SENDMAIL %s'"' >> $HOME/.fetchmailrc
MDA="2"
else
MDA="3"
fi 

echo >> $HOME/.fetchmailrc
echo
echo "This is your $HOME/.fetchmailrc file."

chmod 600 $HOME/.fetchmailrc

echo
cat $HOME/.fetchmailrc

if [ ! "$MAIL" = "" ]; then
echo "Fetchmail will retrieve your mail and put it in:"
echo "$MAIL"
if [ ! -f "$MAIL" ]; then
touch $MAIL 2>/dev/null
chmod 600 $MAIL 2>/dev/null
fi
fi

echo
if [ "$MDA" = "1" ]; then
echo "I put that (m)ail (d)elivery (a)gent in .fetchmailrc"
echo "because i found it on your system, this doesn't mean" 
echo "it's correct or the one you want to use."
echo
echo "The first time you run fetchmail, you should run it"
echo "this way: # fetchmail -k"
echo
elif [ "$MDA" = "2" ]; then
echo "You seem to have sendmail, sendmail will be used"
echo "as the (m)ail (d)elivery (a)gent for fetchmail."
echo
echo "WARNING! There's no way to know if sendmail is set up"
echo "properly for local mail delivery, so the first time you"
echo "run fetchmail run it this way: # fetchmail -k"
echo
echo "If the mail that fetchmail retrieves is not put in your mailbox," 
echo "you'll know that sendmail is not set up properly for the delivery" 
echo "of local mail."
echo
elif [ "$MDA" = "3" ]; then
echo "I Don't know what (m)ail (d)elivery (a)gent you're going to use."
echo "You need a <mda> to deliver the mail to you, after <fetchmail> retrieves it."
echo
echo "Put the <mda> in your .fetchmailrc file, like below."
echo "password $PASS"
echo mda '"/usr/bin/procmail -d %s"'
echo mda '"/usr/sbin/sendmail %s"'
echo
echo "The first time you run fetchmail, you should run it"
echo "this way: # fetchmail -k"
echo
fi
span class="kt">unsigned char)*p)) { *p = tolower((unsigned char)*p); } } strlcpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), sizeof srvrealm); if ((p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) != NULL) { *p = '\0'; } result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session); memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials); des_key_sched(&session, schedule); result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* * Andrew H. Chatham <andrew.chatham@duke.edu> alleges that this check * is not necessary and has consistently been messing him up. */ if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) { report(stderr, GT_("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser, user); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } #endif /* __UNUSED__ */ if (tktinst[0]) { report(stderr, GT_("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"), tktinst); strlcat(tktuser, ".", sizeof(tktuser)); strlcat(tktuser, tktinst, sizeof(tktuser)); } if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) { strlcat(tktuser, "@", sizeof(tktuser)); strlcat(tktuser, tktrealm, sizeof(tktuser)); } result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, challenge1.cint); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) { report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); } strcat(buf1, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the * verification be successful, the server must add one to the * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive. * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The * client should consider the server authenticated if the first * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the * checksum it previously sent. */ if ((result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) != 0) return result; /* The client must construct data with the first four octets * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets * containing a user name string. The client must then append * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the * data with the session key and respond to the second ready * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to * be performed; the server must verify that the principal * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as * that user. After these verifications, the authentication * process is complete. */ len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1, sizeof(buf2)); if (len < 0) { report(stderr, GT_("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0); memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4); if ((int32)ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) { report(stderr, GT_("challenge mismatch\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat); result = htonl(challenge1.cint); memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result); /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as * follows: * * 1 No protection mechanism * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection */ authenticator.dat[4] = 1; len = strlen(tktuser); strncpy((char *)authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len); authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1; while (authenticator.length & 7) { authenticator.length++; } des_pcbc_encrypt((const unsigned char *)authenticator.dat, (unsigned char *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule, &session, 1); to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); /* ship down the response, accept the server's error/ok indication */ suppress_tags = TRUE; result = gen_transact(sock, "%s", buf1); suppress_tags = FALSE; if (result) return(result); else return(PS_SUCCESS); } #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ /* kerberos.c ends here */