/* * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods * * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory. */ #include "config.h" #include #include #include #if defined(STDC_HEADERS) #include #endif #include "fetchmail.h" #include "socket.h" #ifdef KERBEROS_V4 #ifdef KERBEROS_V5 #include #include #else #if defined (__bsdi__) #include #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e]) #endif #if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__) #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e]) #endif #include #endif #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ #include "i18n.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H #include #endif #ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name #endif #endif #include "md5.h" #if OPIE #include #endif /* OPIE */ #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */ extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */ #endif /* strstr */ /* imap_version values */ #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */ #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */ #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */ static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth; static int expunged, expunge_period; static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1]; int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf) /* parse command response */ { char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1]; seen = 0; do { int ok; char *cp; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */ for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++) if (islower(*cp)) *cp = toupper(*cp); /* interpret untagged status responses */ if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY")) strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities)); if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS")) count = atoi(buf+2); if (strstr(buf, "RECENT")) recent = atoi(buf+2); if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN")) { char *cp; /* * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is * a minimum index, not a count. */ unseen = 0; for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++) continue; unseen = atoi(cp); } if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS")) seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL); } while (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag))); if (tag[0] == '\0') { if (argbuf) strcpy(argbuf, buf); return(PS_SUCCESS); } else { char *cp; /* skip the tag */ for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++) continue; while (isspace(*cp)) cp++; if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0) { if (argbuf) strcpy(argbuf, cp); preauth = TRUE; return(PS_SUCCESS); } else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0) { if (argbuf) strcpy(argbuf, cp); return(PS_SUCCESS); } else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0) return(PS_ERROR); else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0) return(PS_ERROR); else return(PS_PROTOCOL); } } #if OPIE static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl) { int i, rval; char buffer[128]; char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1]; char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1]; gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP"); if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) return rval; if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) { report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; }; to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename)); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer); /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */ strcat(buffer, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer)); if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) return rval; if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) { report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; }; rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response); if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) { char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1]; fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: ")); if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0)) rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response); memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret)); }; if (rval) return PS_AUTHFAIL; to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response)); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer); strcat(buffer, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer)); if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) return rval; if (strstr(buffer, "OK")) return PS_SUCCESS; else return PS_AUTHFAIL; }; #endif /* OPIE */ #ifdef KERBEROS_V4 #if SIZEOF_INT == 4 typedef int int32; #elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4 typedef short int32; #elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4 typedef long int32; #else #error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type #endif static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename) /* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */ { int result = 0, len; char buf1[4096], buf2[4096]; union { int32 cint; char cstr[4]; } challenge1, challenge2; char srvinst[INST_SZ]; char *p; char srvrealm[REALM_SZ]; KTEXT_ST authenticator; CREDENTIALS credentials; char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1]; char tktinst[INST_SZ]; char tktrealm[REALM_SZ]; des_cblock session; des_key_schedule schedule; gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4"); /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number * in network byte order. */ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { return result; } /* this patch by Dan Root solves an endianess problem. */ { char tmp[4]; *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr); memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); } len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1); if (len < 0) { report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the * first component of the host name of the server with all letters * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided * 32-bit number in network byte order. */ strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1); srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0'; for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) { if (isupper(*p)) { *p = tolower(*p); } } strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1); srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0'; if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) { *p = '\0'; } result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session); memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials); des_key_sched(&session, schedule); result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) { report(stderr, _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser, user); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } if (tktinst[0]) { report(stderr, _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"), tktinst); strcat(tktuser, "."); strcat(tktuser, tktinst); } if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) { strcat(tktuser, "@"); strcat(tktuser, tktrealm); } result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, challenge1.cint); if (result) { report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) { report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); } strcat(buf1, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the * verification be successful, the server must add one to the * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive. * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The * client should consider the server authenticated if the first * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the * checksum it previously sent. */ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) return result; /* The client must construct data with the first four octets * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets * containing a user name string. The client must then append * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the * data with the session key and respond to the second ready * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to * be performed; the server must verify that the principal * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as * that user. After these verifications, the authentication * process is complete. */ len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1); if (len < 0) { report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0); memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4); if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) { report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat); result = htonl(challenge1.cint); memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result); /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as * follows: * * 1 No protection mechanism * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection */ authenticator.dat[4] = 1; len = strlen(tktuser); strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len); authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1; while (authenticator.length & 7) { authenticator.length++; } des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule, &session, 1); to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) { report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); } strcat(buf1, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) return result; if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) { return PS_SUCCESS; } else { return PS_AUTHFAIL; } } #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ #ifdef GSSAPI #define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1 #define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2 #define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4 static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username) { gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token; gss_buffer_t sec_token; gss_name_t target_name; gss_ctx_id_t context; gss_OID mech_name; gss_qop_t quality; int cflags; OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags; unsigned long buf_size; int result; /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */ sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname); request_buf.value = buf1; request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1; maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &target_name); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf, &mech_name); report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value); maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf); } gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI"); /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns * null data ready response. */ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { return result; } /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */ sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n")); do { send_token.length = 0; send_token.value = NULL; maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &context, target_name, GSS_C_NO_OID, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, 0, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, sec_token, NULL, &send_token, NULL, NULL); if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n")); gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name); /* wake up server and await NO response */ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) return result; return PS_AUTHFAIL; } to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length); gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); strcat(buf1, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name); return result; } request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2); request_buf.value = buf2; sec_token = &request_buf; } } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name); /* get security flags and buffer size */ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { return result; } request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2); request_buf.value = buf2; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token, &cflags, &quality); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n")); gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n")); /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */ server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0]; if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) { report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n")); gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0; buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value)); /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"), server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-", server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-", server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-"); report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size); } /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */ buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */ memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4); buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE; strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */ request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1; request_buf.value = buf1; maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf, &cflags, &send_token); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length); if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { report(stdout, _("Requesting authorisation as %s\n"), username); report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1); } strcat(buf1, "\r\n"); SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) return result; if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) { /* flush security context */ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n")); maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server * knows enough to flush its own credentials */ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); return PS_SUCCESS; } return PS_AUTHFAIL; } #endif /* GSSAPI */ static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len, unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len, unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len) { int i; unsigned char ipad[64]; unsigned char opad[64]; unsigned char hash_passwd[16]; MD5_CTX ctx; if (resp_len != 16) return; if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad)) { MD5Init (&ctx); MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len); MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx); password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd); } memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad)); memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad)); memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len); memcpy (opad, password, pass_len); for (i=0; i<64; i++) { ipad[i] ^= 0x36; opad[i] ^= 0x5c; } MD5Init (&ctx); MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad)); MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len); MD5Final (response, &ctx); MD5Init (&ctx); MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad)); MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len); MD5Final (response, &ctx); } static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl) /* authenticate as per RFC2195 */ { int result; int len; unsigned char buf1[1024]; unsigned char msg_id[768]; unsigned char response[16]; unsigned char reply[1024]; gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5"); /* From RFC2195: * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id' * [RFC822] as described in [POP3]. */ if (result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))) { return result; } len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1); if (len < 0) { report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) { msg_id[len] = 0; } else { msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0; } if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id); } /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp * (including angle-brackets). */ hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password), msg_id, strlen (msg_id), response, sizeof (response)); #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply), #else sprintf(reply, #endif "\"%s\" %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", ctl->remotename, response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3], response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7], response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11], response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]); if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply); } to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply)); if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) { report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); } /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */ strcat (buf1, "\r\n"); SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1)); if (result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))) return result; if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) { return PS_SUCCESS; } else { return PS_AUTHFAIL; } } int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *passwd) /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */ { int i, j; j = 0; for (i = 0; i < strlen(passwd); i++) { if ((passwd[i] == '\\') || (passwd[i] == '"')) result[j++] = '\\'; result[j++] = passwd[i]; } result[j] = '\0'; return(i); } int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) /* apply for connection authorization */ { int ok = 0; char password[PASSWORDLEN*2]; /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */ capabilities[0] = '\0'; if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS) { /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */ if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1")) { imap_version = IMAP4rev1; if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n")); } else { imap_version = IMAP4; if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n")); } } else if (ok == PS_ERROR) { imap_version = IMAP2; if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n")); } else return(ok); peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4); /* * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them * after every message unless user said otherwise. */ if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge)) expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge); else expunge_period = 1; if (preauth) return(PS_SUCCESS); #if OPIE if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP")) { if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n")); if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS) return(PS_SUCCESS); }; #endif /* OPIE */ #ifdef GSSAPI if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI")) { if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS) { if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n")); return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename); } } else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS) { report(stderr, _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n")); return(PS_AUTHFAIL); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ #ifdef KERBEROS_V4 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4")) { if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n")); if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4) { if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename))) { if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n"); SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3); } return(ok); } /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */ } else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4) { report(stderr, _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n")); return(PS_AUTHFAIL); } #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5")) { if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n")); if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl))) { if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n"); SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3); } return ok; } #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */ /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */ if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) { report(stderr, _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; }; #endif /* __UNUSED__ */ imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password); ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, password); if (ok) return(ok); return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int internal_expunge(int sock) /* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */ { int ok; if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE"))) return(ok); expunged += deletions; deletions = 0; #ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */ expunge_uids(ctl); #endif /* IMAP_UID */ return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_getrange(int sock, struct query *ctl, const char *folder, int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes) /* get range of messages to be fetched */ { int ok; /* find out how many messages are waiting */ *bytes = recent = unseen = -1; if (pass > 1) { /* * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message * just after deletion. */ ok = 0; if (deletions && expunge_period != 1) internal_expunge(sock); count = -1; if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP")) { report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n")); return(ok); } else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */ { count = recent = 0; unseen = -1; } } else { if (!check_only) ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX"); else ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX"); if (ok != 0) { report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n")); return(ok); } } *countp = count; /* * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one * are likewise). */ if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */ *newp = count - unseen + 1; else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */ *newp = recent; else *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */ expunged = 0; return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) /* capture the sizes of all messages */ { char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1]; /* * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1) * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality. */ if (count == 1) gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count); else gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count); for (;;) { int num, size, ok; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); if (strstr(buf, "OK")) break; else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2) sizes[num - 1] = size; } return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) /* is the given message old? */ { int ok; /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ number -= expunged; if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0) return(PS_ERROR); return(seen); } static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp) /* request headers of nth message */ { char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1]; int num; /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ number -= expunged; /* * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060. * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag. */ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number); /* looking for FETCH response */ do { int ok; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); } while (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2); if (num != number) return(PS_ERROR); else return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp) /* request body of nth message */ { char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp; int num; /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ number -= expunged; /* * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its * seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange * craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on * the server. * * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion! * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs. */ switch (imap_version) { case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */ if (!ctl->keep) gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number); else gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number); break; case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */ if (!ctl->keep) gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number); else gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number); break; default: /* RFC 1176 */ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number); break; } /* looking for FETCH response */ do { int ok; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); } while (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1); if (num != number) return(PS_ERROR); /* try to extract a length */ if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{'))) *lenp = atoi(cp + 1); else *lenp = 0; return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */ { /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ /* number -= expunged; */ for (;;) { char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1]; int ok; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */ if (strstr(buf, "OK")) break; } return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) /* set delete flag for given message */ { int ok; /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ number -= expunged; /* * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization. * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1. * * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was * successful. */ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, imap_version == IMAP4 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)" : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)", number))) return(ok); else deletions++; /* * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during * the next session. */ if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0) internal_expunge(sock); return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl) /* send logout command */ { /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */ if (deletions) internal_expunge(sock); return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT")); } const static struct method imap = { "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */ #if INET6 "imap", #else /* INET6 */ 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */ #endif /* INET6 */ TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */ FALSE, /* no message delimiter */ imap_ok, /* parse command response */ imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */ imap_getauth, /* get authorization */ imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */ imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */ imap_is_old, /* no UID check */ imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */ imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */ imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */ imap_delete, /* delete the message */ imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */ TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */ }; int doIMAP(struct query *ctl) /* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */ { return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap)); } /* imap.c ends here */