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-rw-r--r--fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt37
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt b/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
index 053b3a02..94be6cf2 100644
--- a/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
+++ b/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ control) files for fetchmail.
2. Problem description and Impact
=================================
-Fetchmail has no configuration facility to enforce TLS connections. This
-can cause passwords to be sent over unencrypted channels in some cases:
+Fetchmail has has several nasty password disclosure vulnerabilities for
+a long time. It was only recently that these have been found.
V1. sslcertck/sslfingerprint options should have implied "sslproto tls1"
in order to enforce TLS negotiation, but did not.
@@ -55,9 +55,16 @@ V2. Even with "sslproto tls1" in the config, fetches would go ahead
in plain text if STLS/STARTTLS wasn't available (not advertised,
or advertised but rejected).
-V3. POP3 fetches would completely ignore all TLS options whether
- available or not because it didn't issue CAPA before checking
- for STLS support.
+V3. POP3 fetches could completely ignore all TLS options whether
+ available or not because it didn't reliably issue CAPA before
+ checking for STLS support, and it would only try STLS if it had seen
+ the server's advertisement.
+
+V4. POP3 could fall back to using plain text passwords, even if strong
+ authentication had been configured.
+
+V5. POP2 would not complain if strong authentication or TLS had been
+ requested.
This can cause eavesdroppers to obtain the password, depending on the
authentication scheme that is configured or auto-selected, and
@@ -65,22 +72,12 @@ subsequently impersonate somebody else when logging into the upstream
server.
-3. Workarounds
-==============
-
-W1. If your upstream offers SSLv3-wrapped service on a dedicated port,
- use fetchmail --ssl --sslcertck --sslproto ssl3 on the command line,
- or equivalent in the run control file. This encrypts the whole session.
-
-The next workarounds do not encrypt the channel, but get along without
-password or mask it:
-
-W2. If your upstream offers authentication schemes that don't require
- cleartext credentials, use the --auth option to select a safe one, such
- as Kerberos, GSSAPI, CRAM-MD5, or perhaps OTP.
+3. Workaround
+=============
-W3. For POP3, if the upstream server supports APOP, you can use
- --protocol apop to select APOP authentication.
+If your upstream offers SSLv3-wrapped service on a dedicated port,
+use fetchmail --ssl --sslcertck --sslproto ssl3 on the command line,
+or equivalent in the run control file. This encrypts the whole session.
4. Solution