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+ <TITLE> [fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication
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+ <H1>[fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication</H1>
+ <B>Ga&#235;tan LEURENT</B>
+ <A HREF="mailto:fetchmail-devel%40lists.berlios.de?Subject=Re%3A%20%5Bfetchmail-devel%5D%20Security%20vulnerability%20in%20APOP%20authentication&In-Reply-To=%3Cqlkbqirheq7.fsf%40clipper.ens.fr%3E"
+ TITLE="[fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication">gaetan.leurent at ens.fr
+ </A><BR>
+ <I>Wed Mar 14 15:55:08 CET 2007</I>
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+<!--beginarticle-->
+<PRE>Hello,
+
+I found a security vulnerability in the APOP authentication. It is
+related to recent collision attacks by Wang and al. against MD5. The
+basic idea is to craft a pair of message-ids that will collide in the
+APOP hash if the password begins in a specified way. So the attacker
+would impersonate a POP server, and send these msg-id; the client will
+return the hash, and the attacker can learn some password characters.
+
+The msg-ids will be generated from a MD5 collision: if you have two
+colliding messages for MD5 &quot;&lt;????@????&gt;x&quot; and &quot;&lt;&#191;&#191;&#191;&#191;@&#191;&#191;&#191;&#191;&gt;x&quot;, and the
+message are of length two blocks, then you will use &quot;&lt;????@????&gt;&quot; and
+&quot;&lt;&#191;&#191;&#191;&#191;@&#191;&#191;&#191;&#191;&gt;&quot; as msg-ids. When the client computes MD5(msg-id||passwd)
+with these two, it will collide if the first password character if 'x',
+no matter what is next (since we are at a block boundary, and the end of
+the password will be the same in the two hashs). Therefore you can
+learn the password characters one by one (actually you can only recover
+three of them, due to the way MD5 collisions are computed).
+
+This attack is really a practical one: it needs about an hour of
+computation and a few hundred authentications from the client, and can
+recover three password characters. I tested it against fetchmail, and
+it does work.
+
+However, using the current techniques available to attack MD5, the
+msg-ids sent by the server can easily be distinguished from genuine ones
+as they will not respect the RFC specification. In particular, they
+will contain non-ASCII characters. Therefore, as a security
+countermeasure, I think fetchmail should reject msg-ids that does not
+conform to the RFC.
+
+The details of the attack and the new results against MD5 needed to
+build it will be presented in the Fast Software Encryption conference on
+March 28. I can send you some more details if needed.
+
+Meanwhile, feel free to alert any one that you believe is concerned.
+I am already sending this mail to the maintainers of Thunderbird,
+Evolution, fetchmail, and mutt. KMail already seems to do enough checks
+on the msg-id to avoid the attack.
+
+Please CC me in any reply.
+
+--
+Ga&#235;tan LEURENT
+
+</PRE>
+
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