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-rw-r--r--NEWS1
-rw-r--r--daemon.c7
-rw-r--r--sink.c2
-rw-r--r--socket.c111
4 files changed, 55 insertions, 66 deletions
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 6a23bcc9..44c0f646 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* SSL certificate options from Thomas Moestl <tmoestl@gmx.net>.
* Frantisek Brabec's patch for better UIDL error recovery.
+* Another zombie-leak patch from HMH.
fetchmail-5.8.3 (Sat May 12 04:07:12 EDT 2001), 20502 lines:
diff --git a/daemon.c b/daemon.c
index eaedc1cf..7cd05dd2 100644
--- a/daemon.c
+++ b/daemon.c
@@ -82,6 +82,11 @@ sigchld_handler (int sig)
lastsig = SIGCHLD;
}
+/*
+ * This function is called by other parts of the program to
+ * setup the sigchld handler after a change to the signal context.
+ * This is done to improve robustness of the signal handling code.
+ */
void deal_with_sigchld(void)
{
RETSIGTYPE sigchld_handler(int);
@@ -95,7 +100,7 @@ void deal_with_sigchld(void)
/* set up to catch child process termination signals */
sa_new.sa_handler = sigchld_handler;
#ifdef SA_RESTART /* SunOS 4.1 portability hack */
- sa_new.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+ sa_new.sa_flags = SA_RESTART | SA_NOCLDSTOP;
#endif
sigaction (SIGCHLD, &sa_new, NULL);
#if defined(SIGPWR)
diff --git a/sink.c b/sink.c
index 1f54b2f8..5759a876 100644
--- a/sink.c
+++ b/sink.c
@@ -937,6 +937,7 @@ void release_sink(struct query *ctl)
#else
sigaction (SIGCHLD, &sa_old, NULL);
#endif /* HAVE_SIGACTION */
+ deal_with_sigchld();
}
}
@@ -960,6 +961,7 @@ int close_sink(struct query *ctl, struct msgblk *msg, flag forward)
#else
sigaction (SIGCHLD, &sa_old, NULL);
#endif /* HAVE_SIGACTION */
+ deal_with_sigchld();
if (rc)
{
report(stderr,
diff --git a/socket.c b/socket.c
index e84211d8..0b2d59f3 100644
--- a/socket.c
+++ b/socket.c
@@ -657,93 +657,76 @@ SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
{
- char buf[260];
- char cbuf[260];
- char ibuf[260];
- char *str_ptr;
+ char buf[257];
X509 *x509_cert;
int err, depth;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
EVP_MD *digest_tp;
unsigned int dsz, i, esz;
+ X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+ subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
+ issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
+
if (depth == 0) {
_depth0ck = 1;
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert), buf, 256);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert), ibuf, 256);
-
- /* Just to be sure those buffers are terminated... I think the
- X509 libraries do, but... */
- buf[256] = ibuf[256] = '\0';
- if( ( str_ptr = strstr( ibuf, "/O=" ) ) ) {
- str_ptr += 3;
- strcpy( cbuf, str_ptr );
- if( ( str_ptr = strchr(cbuf, '/' ) ) ) {
- *str_ptr = '\0';
- }
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, _("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), cbuf );
- } else {
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
+ if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ report(stdout, _("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), buf);
+ if (i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
+ report(stdout, _("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
+ } else
report(stdout, _("Unknown Organization\n"));
- }
- if( ( str_ptr = strstr( ibuf, "/CN=" ) ) ) {
- str_ptr += 4;
- strcpy( cbuf, str_ptr );
- if( ( str_ptr = strchr(cbuf, '/' ) ) ) {
- *str_ptr = '\0';
- }
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, _("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), cbuf );
- } else {
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ report(stdout, _("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
+ if (i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
+ report(stdout, _("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
+ } else
report(stdout, _("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
}
- if( ( str_ptr = strstr( buf, "/CN=" ) ) ) {
- str_ptr += 4;
- strcpy( cbuf, str_ptr );
- if( ( str_ptr = strchr(cbuf, '/' ) ) ) {
- *str_ptr = '\0';
- }
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, _("Server CommonName: %s\n"), cbuf);
-
- if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL)
- {
- char *p1 = cbuf;
+ report(stdout, _("Server CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
+ if (i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
+ * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
+ report(stderr, _("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
+ char *p1 = buf;
char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
int n;
-
- if (*p1 == '*')
- {
+
+ if (*p1 == '*') {
++p1;
n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
if (n >= 0)
p2 += n;
- }
- if ( 0 != strcasecmp( p1, p2 ) ) {
+ }
+ if (0 != strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
report(stderr,
_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
- cbuf, _ssl_server_cname );
+ buf, _ssl_server_cname );
if (ok_return && strict)
- return( 0 );
+ return (0);
}
} else if (ok_return && strict) {
- report(stderr, _("Canonical server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
- return( 0 );
- }
+ report(stderr, _("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
} else {
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
report(stdout, _("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
if (ok_return && strict) {
report(stderr, _("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
- return( 0 );
+ return (0);
}
}
/* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
@@ -753,11 +736,11 @@ int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
digest_tp = EVP_md5();
if (digest_tp == NULL) {
report(stderr, _("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
- return( 0 );
+ return (0);
}
if (!X509_digest(x509_cert, digest_tp, digest, &dsz)) {
- report(stderr, _("out of memory!\n"));
- return( 0 );
+ report(stderr, _("Out of memory!\n"));
+ return (0);
}
tp = text;
te = text + sizeof(text);
@@ -765,7 +748,7 @@ int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, i > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[i]);
if (esz >= te - tp) {
report(stderr, _("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
- return( 0 );
+ return (0);
}
tp += esz;
}
@@ -775,7 +758,7 @@ int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
report(stdout, _("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
else {
report(stderr, _("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
- return( 0 );
+ return (0);
}
}
}
@@ -784,19 +767,17 @@ int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
if (err != X509_V_OK && (strict || outlevel == O_VERBOSE)) {
report(strict ? stderr : stdout, _("Warning: server certificate verification: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
/* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
- switch (ctx->error) {
+ switch (err) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256);
- buf[256] = '\0';
- report(stdout, _("unknown issuer= %s\n"), buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stdout, _("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), sizeof(buf), buf);
break;
}
}
- /* We are not requiring or validating server or issuer id's as yet */
- /* Always return OK from here */
if (!strict)
ok_return = 1;
- return( ok_return );
+ return (ok_return);
}
int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-10-31 02:35:14 +0000