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authorMatthias Andree <matthias.andree@gmx.de>2011-05-26 01:47:41 +0200
committerMatthias Andree <matthias.andree@gmx.de>2011-05-26 02:00:30 +0200
commit1e13bb35731999c4668883acd404ede047793e1e (patch)
treea881c8f44417ca86c36424a15fbdd6faaa734da9 /pop3.c
parentf285f5ee95765133b41d6ecae0f397b3b72fa6d4 (diff)
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Run S(TART)TLS negotiation under timeout alarm.
Reported missing by Thomas Jarosch.
Diffstat (limited to 'pop3.c')
-rw-r--r--pop3.c7
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/pop3.c b/pop3.c
index 3def391b..9cf84944 100644
--- a/pop3.c
+++ b/pop3.c
@@ -448,9 +448,9 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
* whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails
* (see below). */
if (gen_transact(sock, "STLS") == PS_SUCCESS
- && SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
+ && (set_timeout(mytimeout), SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname,
- ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename) != -1)
+ ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename)) != -1)
{
/*
* RFC 2595 says this:
@@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
* Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can
* guarantee a secure capability re-probe.
*/
+ set_timeout(0);
done_capa = FALSE;
ok = capa_probe(sock);
if (ok != PS_SUCCESS) {
@@ -477,6 +478,7 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
} else if (must_tls(ctl)) {
/* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must
* stop. */
+ set_timeout(0);
report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname);
return PS_SOCKET;
} else {
@@ -485,6 +487,7 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
* allowed til post-authentication), so leave it in an unknown
* state, mark it as such, and check more carefully if things
* go wrong when we try to authenticate. */
+ set_timeout(0);
connection_may_have_tls_errors = TRUE;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
{