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| author | Matthias Andree <matthias.andree@gmx.de> | 2014-05-21 22:27:26 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Matthias Andree <matthias.andree@gmx.de> | 2014-05-21 22:31:06 +0200 |
| commit | 358b72cbe65c780e3a63cd104f41333dffcda60c (patch) | |
| tree | ff7f9dffa65b32d65dc32d8b10b85b628b6cd285 /archived-messages/000887.html | |
| parent | f287ff471c7e08c3e94ad915540468f1b480c55d (diff) | |
| download | fetchmail-358b72cbe65c780e3a63cd104f41333dffcda60c.tar.gz fetchmail-358b72cbe65c780e3a63cd104f41333dffcda60c.tar.bz2 fetchmail-358b72cbe65c780e3a63cd104f41333dffcda60c.zip | |
Convert most references from berlios.de to sourceforge.net.
Re-sign EN and SAs because that broke signatures.
Diffstat (limited to 'archived-messages/000887.html')
| -rw-r--r-- | archived-messages/000887.html | 105 |
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/archived-messages/000887.html b/archived-messages/000887.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8398caa --- /dev/null +++ b/archived-messages/000887.html @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:fetchmail-devel%40lists.berlios.de?Subject=Re%3A%20%5Bfetchmail-devel%5D%20Security%20vulnerability%20in%20APOP%20authentication&In-Reply-To=%3Cqlkbqirheq7.fsf%40clipper.ens.fr%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <style type="text/css"> + pre { + white-space: pre-wrap; /* css-2.1, curent FF, Opera, Safari */ + } + </style> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="000884.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="000889.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication</H1> + <B>Gaëtan LEURENT</B> + <A HREF="mailto:fetchmail-devel%40lists.berlios.de?Subject=Re%3A%20%5Bfetchmail-devel%5D%20Security%20vulnerability%20in%20APOP%20authentication&In-Reply-To=%3Cqlkbqirheq7.fsf%40clipper.ens.fr%3E" + TITLE="[fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication">gaetan.leurent at ens.fr + </A><BR> + <I>Wed Mar 14 15:55:08 CET 2007</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="000884.html">[fetchmail-devel] Bug#413059: --sslcheck - non-existent option in the man page +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="000889.html">[fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#887">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#887">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#887">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#887">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Hello, + +I found a security vulnerability in the APOP authentication. It is +related to recent collision attacks by Wang and al. against MD5. The +basic idea is to craft a pair of message-ids that will collide in the +APOP hash if the password begins in a specified way. So the attacker +would impersonate a POP server, and send these msg-id; the client will +return the hash, and the attacker can learn some password characters. + +The msg-ids will be generated from a MD5 collision: if you have two +colliding messages for MD5 "<????@????>x" and "<¿¿¿¿@¿¿¿¿>x", and the +message are of length two blocks, then you will use "<????@????>" and +"<¿¿¿¿@¿¿¿¿>" as msg-ids. When the client computes MD5(msg-id||passwd) +with these two, it will collide if the first password character if 'x', +no matter what is next (since we are at a block boundary, and the end of +the password will be the same in the two hashs). Therefore you can +learn the password characters one by one (actually you can only recover +three of them, due to the way MD5 collisions are computed). + +This attack is really a practical one: it needs about an hour of +computation and a few hundred authentications from the client, and can +recover three password characters. I tested it against fetchmail, and +it does work. + +However, using the current techniques available to attack MD5, the +msg-ids sent by the server can easily be distinguished from genuine ones +as they will not respect the RFC specification. In particular, they +will contain non-ASCII characters. Therefore, as a security +countermeasure, I think fetchmail should reject msg-ids that does not +conform to the RFC. + +The details of the attack and the new results against MD5 needed to +build it will be presented in the Fast Software Encryption conference on +March 28. I can send you some more details if needed. + +Meanwhile, feel free to alert any one that you believe is concerned. +I am already sending this mail to the maintainers of Thunderbird, +Evolution, fetchmail, and mutt. KMail already seems to do enough checks +on the msg-id to avoid the attack. + +Please CC me in any reply. + +-- +Gaëtan LEURENT + +</PRE> + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="000884.html">[fetchmail-devel] Bug#413059: --sslcheck - non-existent option in the man page +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="000889.html">[fetchmail-devel] Security vulnerability in APOP authentication +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#887">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#887">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#887">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#887">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/fetchmail-devel">More information about the fetchmail-devel +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> |