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author | Rob Funk <rfunk@funknet.net> | 2004-06-08 03:59:01 +0000 |
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+
+
+
+
+Network Working Group R. Gellens
+Request for Comments: 2449 Qualcomm
+Updates: 1939 C. Newman
+Category: Standards Track Innosoft
+ L. Lundblade
+ Qualcomm
+ November 1998
+
+
+ POP3 Extension Mechanism
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+ This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+ Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+ improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+ Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+ and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
+
+IESG Note
+
+ This extension to the POP3 protocol is to be used by a server to
+ express policy descisions taken by the server administrator. It is
+ not an endorsement of implementations of further POP3 extensions
+ generally. It is the general view that the POP3 protocol should stay
+ simple, and for the simple purpose of downloading email from a mail
+ server. If more complicated operations are needed, the IMAP protocol
+ [RFC 2060] should be used. The first paragraph of section 7 should
+ be read very carefully.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+ 2. Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 3. General Command and Response Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 4. Parameter and Response Lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 5. The CAPA Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 6. Initial Set of Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+ 6.1. TOP capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 6.2. USER capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 6.3. SASL capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 6.4. RESP-CODES capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 6.5. LOGIN-DELAY capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 6.6. PIPELINING capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 1]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ 6.7. EXPIRE capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6.8. UIDL capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+ 6.9. IMPLEMENTATION capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+ 7. Future Extensions to POP3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+ 8. Extended POP3 Response Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+ 8.1. Initial POP3 response codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+ 8.1.1. The LOGIN-DELAY response code . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+ 8.1.2. The IN-USE response code . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+ 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+ 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+ 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+ 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+ 13. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+ 14. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The Post Office Protocol version 3 [POP3] is very widely used.
+ However, while it includes some optional commands (and some useful
+ protocol extensions have been published), it lacks a mechanism for
+ advertising support for these extensions or for behavior variations.
+
+ Currently these optional features and extensions can only be detected
+ by probing, if at all. This is at best inefficient, and possibly
+ worse. As a result, some clients have manual configuration options
+ for POP3 server capabilities.
+
+ Because one of the most important characteristics of POP3 is its
+ simplicity, it is desirable that extensions be few in number (see
+ section 7). However, some extensions are necessary (such as ones
+ that provide improved security [POP-AUTH]), while others are very
+ desirable in certain situations. In addition, a means for
+ discovering server behavior is needed.
+
+ This memo updates RFC 1939 [POP3] to define a mechanism to announce
+ support for optional commands, extensions, and unconditional server
+ behavior. Included is an initial set of currently deployed
+ capabilities which vary between server implementations, and several
+ new capabilities (SASL, RESP-CODES, LOGIN-DELAY, PIPELINING, EXPIRE
+ and IMPLEMENTATION). This document also extends POP3 error messages
+ so that machine parsable codes can be provided to the client. An
+ initial set of response codes is included. In addition, an [ABNF]
+ specification of POP3 commands and responses is defined.
+
+ Public comments should be sent to the IETF POP3 Extensions mailing
+ list, <ietf-pop3ext@imc.org>. To subscribe, send a message
+ containing SUBSCRIBE to <ietf-pop3ext-request@imc.org>.
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 2]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+2. Conventions Used in this Document
+
+ The key words "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
+ and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key
+ words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].
+
+ In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
+ server respectively.
+
+3. General Command and Response Grammar
+
+ The general form of POP3 commands and responses is described using
+ [ABNF]:
+
+ POP3 commands:
+
+ command = keyword *(SP param) CRLF ;255 octets maximum
+ keyword = 3*4VCHAR
+ param = 1*VCHAR
+
+ POP3 responses:
+
+ response = greeting / single-line / capa-resp / multi-line
+ capa-resp = single-line *capability "." CRLF
+ capa-tag = 1*cchar
+ capability = capa-tag *(SP param) CRLF ;512 octets maximum
+ cchar = %x21-2D / %x2F-7F
+ ;printable ASCII, excluding "."
+ dot-stuffed = *CHAR CRLF ;must be dot-stuffed
+ gchar = %x21-3B / %x3D-7F
+ ;printable ASCII, excluding "<"
+ greeting = "+OK" [resp-code] *gchar [timestamp] *gchar CRLF
+ ;512 octets maximum
+ multi-line = single-line *dot-stuffed "." CRLF
+ rchar = %x21-2E / %x30-5C / %x5E-7F
+ ;printable ASCII, excluding "/" and "]"
+ resp-code = "[" resp-level *("/" resp-level) "]"
+ resp-level = 1*rchar
+ schar = %x21-5A / %x5C-7F
+ ;printable ASCII, excluding "["
+ single-line = status [SP text] CRLF ;512 octets maximum
+ status = "+OK" / "-ERR"
+ text = *schar / resp-code *CHAR
+ timestamp = "<" *VCHAR ">"
+ ;MUST conform to RFC-822 msg-id
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 3]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+4. Parameter and Response Lengths
+
+ This specification increases the length restrictions on commands and
+ parameters imposed by RFC 1939.
+
+ The maximum length of a command is increased from 47 characters (4
+ character command, single space, 40 character argument, CRLF) to 255
+ octets, including the terminating CRLF.
+
+ Servers which support the CAPA command MUST support commands up to
+ 255 octets. Servers MUST also support the largest maximum command
+ length specified by any supported capability.
+
+ The maximum length of the first line of a command response (including
+ the initial greeting) is unchanged at 512 octets (including the
+ terminating CRLF).
+
+5. The CAPA Command
+
+ The POP3 CAPA command returns a list of capabilities supported by the
+ POP3 server. It is available in both the AUTHORIZATION and
+ TRANSACTION states.
+
+ A capability description MUST document in which states the capability
+ is announced, and in which states the commands are valid.
+
+ Capabilities available in the AUTHORIZATION state MUST be announced
+ in both states.
+
+ If a capability is announced in both states, but the argument might
+ differ after authentication, this possibility MUST be stated in the
+ capability description.
+
+ (These requirements allow a client to issue only one CAPA command if
+ it does not use any TRANSACTION-only capabilities, or any
+ capabilities whose values may differ after authentication.)
+
+ If the authentication step negotiates an integrity protection layer,
+ the client SHOULD reissue the CAPA command after authenticating, to
+ check for active down-negotiation attacks.
+
+ Each capability may enable additional protocol commands, additional
+ parameters and responses for existing commands, or describe an aspect
+ of server behavior. These details are specified in the description
+ of the capability.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 4]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ Section 3 describes the CAPA response using [ABNF]. When a
+ capability response describes an optional command, the <capa-tag>
+ SHOULD be identical to the command keyword. CAPA response tags are
+ case-insensitive.
+
+ CAPA
+
+ Arguments:
+ none
+
+ Restrictions:
+ none
+
+ Discussion:
+ An -ERR response indicates the capability command is not
+ implemented and the client will have to probe for
+ capabilities as before.
+
+ An +OK response is followed by a list of capabilities, one
+ per line. Each capability name MAY be followed by a single
+ space and a space-separated list of parameters. Each
+ capability line is limited to 512 octets (including the
+ CRLF). The capability list is terminated by a line
+ containing a termination octet (".") and a CRLF pair.
+
+ Possible Responses:
+ +OK -ERR
+
+ Examples:
+ C: CAPA
+ S: +OK Capability list follows
+ S: TOP
+ S: USER
+ S: SASL CRAM-MD5 KERBEROS_V4
+ S: RESP-CODES
+ S: LOGIN-DELAY 900
+ S: PIPELINING
+ S: EXPIRE 60
+ S: UIDL
+ S: IMPLEMENTATION Shlemazle-Plotz-v302
+ S: .
+
+6. Initial Set of Capabilities
+
+ This section defines an initial set of POP3 capabilities. These
+ include the optional POP3 commands, already published POP3
+ extensions, and behavior variations between POP3 servers which can
+ impact clients.
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 5]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ Note that there is no APOP capability, even though APOP is an
+ optional command in [POP3]. Clients discover server support of APOP
+ by the presence in the greeting banner of an initial challenge
+ enclosed in angle brackets ("<>"). Therefore, an APOP capability
+ would introduce two ways for a server to announce the same thing.
+
+6.1. TOP capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ TOP
+
+ Arguments:
+ none
+
+ Added commands:
+ TOP
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ none
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / no
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ TRANSACTION
+
+ Specification reference:
+ [POP3]
+
+ Discussion:
+ The TOP capability indicates the optional TOP command is
+ available.
+
+6.2. USER capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ USER
+
+ Arguments:
+ none
+
+ Added commands:
+ USER PASS
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ none
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 6]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / no
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ AUTHENTICATION
+
+ Specification reference:
+ [POP3]
+
+ Discussion:
+ The USER capability indicates that the USER and PASS commands
+ are supported, although they may not be available to all users.
+
+6.3. SASL capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ SASL
+
+ Arguments:
+ Supported SASL mechanisms
+
+ Added commands:
+ AUTH
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ none
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / no
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ AUTHENTICATION
+
+ Specification reference:
+ [POP-AUTH, SASL]
+
+ Discussion:
+ The POP3 AUTH command [POP-AUTH] permits the use of [SASL]
+ authentication mechanisms with POP3. The SASL capability
+ indicates that the AUTH command is available and that it supports
+ an optional base64 encoded second argument for an initial client
+ response as described in the SASL specification. The argument to
+ the SASL capability is a space separated list of SASL mechanisms
+ which are supported.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 7]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+6.4. RESP-CODES capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ RESP-CODES
+
+ Arguments:
+ none
+
+ Added commands:
+ none
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ none
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / no
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ n/a
+
+ Specification reference:
+ this document
+
+ Discussion:
+ The RESP-CODES capability indicates that any response text issued
+ by this server which begins with an open square bracket ("[") is
+ an extended response code (see section 8).
+
+6.5. LOGIN-DELAY capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ LOGIN-DELAY
+
+ Arguments:
+ minimum seconds between logins; optionally followed by USER in
+ AUTHENTICATION state.
+
+ Added commands:
+ none
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ USER PASS APOP AUTH
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / yes
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ n/a
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 8]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ Specification reference:
+ this document
+
+ Discussion:
+ POP3 clients often login frequently to check for new mail.
+ Unfortunately, the process of creating a connection,
+ authenticating the user, and opening the user's maildrop can be
+ very resource intensive on the server. A number of deployed POP3
+ servers try to reduce server load by requiring a delay between
+ logins. The LOGIN-DELAY capability includes an integer argument
+ which indicates the number of seconds after an "+OK" response to
+ a PASS, APOP, or AUTH command before another authentication will
+ be accepted. Clients which permit the user to configure a mail
+ check interval SHOULD use this capability to determine the
+ minimum permissible interval. Servers which advertise LOGIN-
+ DELAY SHOULD enforce it.
+
+ If the minimum login delay period could differ per user (that is,
+ the LOGIN-DELAY argument might change after authentication), the
+ server MUST announce in AUTHENTICATION state the largest value
+ which could be set for any user. This might be the largest value
+ currently in use for any user (so only one value per server), or
+ even the largest value which the server permits to be set for any
+ user. The server SHOULD append the token "USER" to the LOGIN-
+ DELAY parameter in AUTHENTICATION state, to inform the client
+ that a more accurate value is available after authentication.
+ The server SHOULD announce the more accurate value in TRANSACTION
+ state. (The "USER" token allows the client to decide if a second
+ CAPA command is needed or not.)
+
+ Servers enforce LOGIN-DELAY by rejecting an authentication
+ command with or without the LOGIN-DELAY error response. See
+ section 8.1.1 for more information.
+
+6.6. PIPELINING capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ PIPELINING
+
+ Arguments:
+ none
+
+ Added commands:
+ none
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ all
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 9]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / no
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ n/a
+
+ Specification reference:
+ this document
+
+ Discussion:
+ The PIPELINING capability indicates the server is capable of
+ accepting multiple commands at a time; the client does not have
+ to wait for the response to a command before issuing a subsequent
+ command. If a server supports PIPELINING, it MUST process each
+ command in turn. If a client uses PIPELINING, it MUST keep track
+ of which commands it has outstanding, and match server responses
+ to commands in order. If either the client or server uses
+ blocking writes, it MUST not exceed the window size of the
+ underlying transport layer.
+
+ Some POP3 clients have an option to indicate the server supports
+ "Overlapped POP3 commands." This capability removes the need to
+ configure this at the client.
+
+ This is roughly synonymous with the ESMTP PIPELINING extension
+ [PIPELINING], however, since SMTP [SMTP] tends to have short
+ commands and responses, the benefit is in grouping multiple
+ commands and sending them as a unit. While there are cases of
+ this in POP (for example, USER and PASS could be batched,
+ multiple RETR and/or DELE commands could be sent as a group),
+ because POP has short commands and sometimes lengthy responses,
+ there is also an advantage is sending new commands while still
+ receiving the response to an earlier command (for example,
+ sending RETR and/or DELE commands while processing a UIDL reply).
+
+6.7. EXPIRE capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ EXPIRE
+
+ Arguments:
+ server-guaranteed minimum retention days, or NEVER; optionally
+ followed by USER in AUTHENTICATION state
+
+ Added commands:
+ none
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 10]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ none
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / yes
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ n/a
+
+ Specification reference:
+ this document
+
+ Discussion:
+ While POP3 allows clients to leave messages on the server, RFC
+ 1939 [POP3] warns about the problems that may arise from this,
+ and allows servers to delete messages based on site policy.
+
+ The EXPIRE capability avoids the problems mentioned in RFC 1939,
+ by allowing the server to inform the client as to the policy in
+ effect. The argument to the EXPIRE capability indicates the
+ minimum server retention period, in days, for messages on the
+ server.
+
+ EXPIRE 0 indicates the client is not permitted to leave mail on
+ the server; when the session enters the UPDATE state the server
+ MAY assume an implicit DELE for each message which was downloaded
+ with RETR.
+
+ EXPIRE NEVER asserts that the server does not delete messages.
+
+ The concept of a "retention period" is intentionally vague.
+ Servers may start counting days to expiration when a message is
+ added to a maildrop, when a client becomes aware of the existence
+ of a message through the LIST or UIDL commands, when a message
+ has been acted upon in some way (for example, TOP or RETR), or at
+ some other event. The EXPIRE capability cannot provide a precise
+ indication as to exactly when any specific message will expire.
+ The capability is intended to make it easier for clients to
+ behave in ways which conform to site policy and user wishes. For
+ example, a client might display a warning for attempts to
+ configure a "leave mail on server" period which is greater than
+ or equal to some percentage of the value announced by the server.
+
+ If a site uses any automatic deletion policy, it SHOULD use the
+ EXPIRE capability to announce this.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 11]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ The EXPIRE capability, with a parameter other than 0 or NEVER, is
+ intended to let the client know that the server does permit mail
+ to be left on the server, and to present a value which is the
+ smallest which might be in force.
+
+ Sites which permit users to retain messages indefinitely SHOULD
+ announce this with the EXPIRE NEVER response.
+
+ If the expiration policy differs per user (that is, the EXPIRE
+ argument might change after authentication), the server MUST
+ announce in AUTHENTICATION state the smallest value which could
+ be set for any user. This might be the smallest value currently
+ in use for any user (so only one value per server), or even the
+ smallest value which the server permits to be set for any user.
+ The server SHOULD append the token "USER" to the EXPIRE parameter
+ in AUTHENTICATION state, to inform the client that a more
+ accurate value is available after authentication. The server
+ SHOULD announce the more accurate value in TRANSACTION state.
+ (The "USER" token allows the client to decide if a second CAPA
+ command is needed or not.)
+
+ A site may have a message expiration policy which treats messages
+ differently depending on which user actions have been performed,
+ or based on other factors. For example, a site might delete
+ unseen messages after 60 days, and completely- or partially-seen
+ messages after 15 days.
+
+ The announced EXPIRE value is the smallest retention period which
+ is or might be used by any category or condition of the current
+ site policy, for any user (in AUTHENTICATION state) or the
+ specific user (in TRANSACTION state). That is, EXPIRE informs
+ the client of the minimum number of days messages may remain on
+ the server under any circumstances.
+
+ Examples:
+ EXPIRE 5 USER
+ EXPIRE 30
+ EXPIRE NEVER
+ EXPIRE 0
+
+ The first example indicates the server might delete messages
+ after five days, but the period differs per user, and so a more
+ accurate value can be obtained by issuing a second CAPA command
+ in TRANSACTION state. The second example indicates the server
+ could delete messages after 30 days. In the third example, the
+ server announces it does not delete messages. The fourth example
+ specifies that the site does not permit messages to be left on
+ the server.
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 12]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+6.8. UIDL capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ UIDL
+
+ Arguments:
+ none
+
+ Added commands:
+ UIDL
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ none
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both / no
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ TRANSACTION
+
+ Specification reference:
+ [POP3]
+
+ Discussion:
+ The UIDL capability indicates that the optional UIDL command is
+ supported.
+
+6.9. IMPLEMENTATION capability
+
+ CAPA tag:
+ IMPLEMENTATION
+
+ Arguments:
+ string giving server implementation information
+
+ Added commands:
+ none
+
+ Standard commands affected:
+ none
+
+ Announced states / possible differences:
+ both (optionally TRANSACTION only) / no
+
+ Commands valid in states:
+ n/a
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 13]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ Specification reference:
+ this document
+
+ Discussion:
+ It is often useful to identify an implementation of a particular
+ server (for example, when logging). This is commonly done in the
+ welcome banner, but one must guess if a string is an
+ implementation ID or not.
+
+ The argument to the IMPLEMENTATION capability consists of one or
+ more tokens which identify the server. (Note that since CAPA
+ response tag arguments are space-separated, it may be convenient
+ for the IMPLEMENTATION capability argument to not contain spaces,
+ so that it is a single token.)
+
+ Normally, servers announce IMPLEMENTATION in both states.
+ However, a server MAY chose to do so only in TRANSACTION state.
+
+ A server MAY include the implementation identification both in
+ the welcome banner and in the IMPLEMENTATION capability.
+
+ Clients MUST NOT modify their behavior based on the server
+ implementation. Instead the server and client should agree on a
+ private extension.
+
+7. Future Extensions to POP3
+
+ Future extensions to POP3 are in general discouraged, as POP3's
+ usefulness lies in its simplicity. POP3 is intended as a download-
+ and-delete protocol; mail access capabilities are available in IMAP
+ [IMAP4]. Extensions which provide support for additional mailboxes,
+ allow uploading of messages to the server, or which deviate from
+ POP's download-and-delete model are strongly discouraged and unlikely
+ to be permitted on the IETF standards track.
+
+ Clients MUST NOT require the presence of any extension for basic
+ functionality, with the exception of the authentication commands
+ (APOP, AUTH [section 6.3] and USER/PASS).
+
+ Section 9 specifies how additional capabilities are defined.
+
+8. Extended POP3 Response Codes
+
+ Unextended POP3 is only capable of indicating success or failure to
+ most commands. Unfortunately, clients often need to know more
+ information about the cause of a failure in order to gracefully
+ recover. This is especially important in response to a failed login
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 14]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ (there are widely-deployed clients which attempt to decode the error
+ text of a PASS command result, to try and distinguish between "unable
+ to get maildrop lock" and "bad login").
+
+ This specification amends the POP3 standard to permit an optional
+ response code, enclosed in square brackets, at the beginning of the
+ human readable text portion of an "+OK" or "-ERR" response. Clients
+ supporting this extension MAY remove any information enclosed in
+ square brackets prior to displaying human readable text to the user.
+ Immediately following the open square bracket "[" character is a
+ response code which is interpreted in a case-insensitive fashion by
+ the client.
+
+ The response code is hierarchical, with a "/" separating levels of
+ detail about the error. Clients MUST ignore unknown hierarchical
+ detail about the response code. This is important, as it could be
+ necessary to provide further detail for response codes in the future.
+
+ Section 3 describes response codes using [ABNF].
+
+ If a server supports extended response codes, it indicates this by
+ including the RESP-CODES capability in the CAPA response.
+
+ Examples:
+ C: APOP mrose c4c9334bac560ecc979e58001b3e22fb
+ S: -ERR [IN-USE] Do you have another POP session running?
+
+8.1. Initial POP3 response codes
+
+ This specification defines two POP3 response codes which can be used
+ to determine the reason for a failed login. Section 9 specifies how
+ additional response codes are defined.
+
+8.1.1. The LOGIN-DELAY response code
+
+ This occurs on an -ERR response to an AUTH, USER (see note), PASS or
+ APOP command and indicates that the user has logged in recently and
+ will not be allowed to login again until the login delay period has
+ expired.
+
+ NOTE: Returning the LOGIN-DELAY response code to the USER command
+ avoids the work of authenticating the user but reveals to the client
+ that the specified user exists. Unless the server is operating in an
+ environment where user names are not secret (for example, many
+ popular email clients advertise the POP server and user name in an
+ outgoing mail header), or where server access is restricted, or the
+ server can verify that the connection is to the same user, it is
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 15]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ strongly recommended that the server not issue this response code to
+ the USER command. The server still saves the cost of opening the
+ maildrop, which in some environments is the most expensive step.
+
+8.1.2. The IN-USE response code
+
+ This occurs on an -ERR response to an AUTH, APOP, or PASS command.
+ It indicates the authentication was successful, but the user's
+ maildrop is currently in use (probably by another POP3 client).
+
+9. IANA Considerations
+
+ This document requests that IANA maintain two new registries: POP3
+ capabilities and POP3 response codes.
+
+ New POP3 capabilities MUST be defined in a standards track or IESG
+ approved experimental RFC, and MUST NOT begin with the letter "X".
+
+ New POP3 capabilities MUST include the following information:
+ CAPA tag
+ Arguments
+ Added commands
+ Standard commands affected
+ Announced states / possible differences
+ Commands valid in states
+ Specification reference
+ Discussion
+
+ In addition, new limits for POP3 command and response lengths may
+ need to be included.
+
+ New POP3 response codes MUST be defined in an RFC or other permanent
+ and readily available reference, in sufficient detail so that
+ interoperability between independent implementations is possible.
+ (This is the "Specification Required" policy described in [IANA]).
+
+ New POP3 response code specifications MUST include the following
+ information: the complete response code, for which responses (+OK
+ or -ERR) and commands it is valid, and a definition of its meaning and
+ expected client behavior.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 16]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+10. Security Considerations
+
+ A capability list can reveal information about the server's
+ authentication mechanisms which can be used to determine if certain
+ attacks will be successful. However, allowing clients to
+ automatically detect availability of stronger mechanisms and alter
+ their configurations to use them can improve overall security at a
+ site.
+
+ Section 8.1 discusses the security issues related to use of the
+ LOGIN-DELAY response code with the USER command.
+
+11. Acknowledgments
+
+ This document has been revised in part based on comments and
+ discussions which took place on and off the IETF POP3 Extensions
+ mailing list. The help of those who took the time to review this
+ memo and make suggestions is appreciated, especially that of Alexey
+ Melnikov, Harald Alvestrand, and Mike Gahrns.
+
+12. References
+
+ [ABNF] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
+ Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
+
+ [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
+ IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
+ October 1998.
+
+ [IMAP4] Crispin, M., "Internet Message Access Protocol --
+ Version 4rev1", RFC 2060, December 1996.
+
+ [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [PIPELINING] Freed, N., "SMTP Service Extension for Command
+ Pipelining", RFC 2197, September 1997.
+
+ [POP3] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol -- Version
+ 3", STD 53, RFC 1939, May 1996.
+
+ [POP-AUTH] Myers, J., "POP3 AUTHentication command", RFC 1734,
+ December 1994.
+
+ [SASL] Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
+ (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997.
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 17]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+ [SMTP] Postel, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", STD 10, RFC
+ 821, August 1982.
+
+13. Authors' Addresses
+
+ Randall Gellens
+ QUALCOMM Incorporated
+ 6455 Lusk Blvd.
+ San Diego, CA 92121-2779
+ USA
+
+ Phone: +1 619 651 5115
+ Fax: +1 619 845 7268
+ EMail: randy@qualcomm.com
+
+
+ Chris Newman
+ Innosoft International, Inc.
+ 1050 Lakes Drive
+ West Covina, CA 91790
+ USA
+
+ EMail: chris.newman@innosoft.com
+
+
+ Laurence Lundblade
+ QUALCOMM Incorporated
+ 6455 Lusk Blvd.
+ San Diego, Ca, 92121-2779
+ USA
+
+ Phone: +1 619 658 3584
+ Fax: +1 619 845 7268
+ EMail: lgl@qualcomm.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 18]
+
+RFC 2449 POP3 Extension Mechanism November 1998
+
+
+14. Full Copyright Statement
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
+
+ This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
+ others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
+ or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
+ and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
+ kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
+ document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
+ the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
+ Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
+ developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
+ copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
+ followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
+ English.
+
+ The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
+ revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
+
+ This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
+ "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
+ TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
+ HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+
+
+
+
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+
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+
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+Gellens, et. al. Standards Track [Page 19]
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